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THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: NEW
CHALLENGES IN AIRLINE HIRING PRACTICES
JOHN A. CONWAY
T HE AMERICANS WITH Disabilities Act of 1990'
(ADA) is one of the more significant pieces of civil
rights legislation this century.2 The ADA attempts to re-
move discriminatory barriers that millions of Americans
face each day in employment, public accommodation, and
transportation.3 In a speech accompanying the signing of
the ADA, President George Bush stated, "[a]s the Decla-
ration of Independence has been a beacon for people all
over the world seeking freedom, it is my hope that the
Americans with Disabilities Act will likewise come to be a
model for the choices and opportunities of future genera-
tions around the world."4 The ADA fills gaping holes in
other federal legislation designed to protect the disabled
from discrimination. 5 Very few employers are beyond the
ADA's reach. 6 Accordingly, the broad sweep of the ADA
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101-12,213 (Supp. III 1991).
2 White House Briefing, Federal News Service (Nov. 22, 1991). President
Bush's press secretary, Marlin Fitzwater, stated that the ADA is "one of the most
important civil rights acts of this century .... [I]t is a dramatic piece of legislation
that brings millions of Americans under the protection of the civil rights laws."
Id.
, ADA Compliance, Understanding the Challenges, 55 TEX. B.J. 813, 813 (1992).
Statement by President George Bush Upon Signing S. 933, 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 602 (July 30, 1990).
5 For example, the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 793-94c (1988) applies only
to employers and state or federal agencies that receive federal funding. The ADA,
however, covers a much larger number of employers and will thus provide equal
employment opportunities to millions more disabled Americans. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12,111(2) (Supp. III 1991) (defining covered entity).
6 42 U.S.C. § 12,111(5)(A) (Supp. III 1991) defines employer as a:
person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or
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will present new challenges to the airline industry's hiring
practices. 7
Concerned with the tremendous barriers facing the dis-
abled worker, Congress set out to develop comprehensive
legislation aimed at setting a national mandate to prevent
unjust discrimination against the disabled in the
workforce.8 A poll conducted by Louis Harris Associates
revealed that of the estimated forty-three million disabled
Americans, two-thirds of those between the ages of six-
teen and sixty-four are not working. 9 Two-thirds of the
group of nonworking disabled state that they would work
more employees ... except that, for two years following the effective
date of this subchapter, an employer means a person engaged in an
industry affecting commerce who has 25 or more employees.
Id. The only exceptions to this definition are: (1) the United States, a corporation
wholly owned by the government of the United States, or an Indian tribe; and (2)
a bona fide private membership club. Id. § 12,111(5)(B).
I Because of the unique hiring conditions affecting pilots and flight attendants,
the scope of this comment is limited to thesejobs. For a discussion of the effect of
the ADA in other employment positions, see Elizabeth C. Morin, Americans With
Disabilities Act of 1990. Social Integration Through Employment, 40 CATH. U. L. REv.
189 (1990).
H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 22-23, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 304. Congress based the ADA on findings made by Congres-
sional subcommittees and the National Council on Disability. 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 310. These findings convinced Congress of the overwhelming need for na-
tional legislation. The conclusions are as follows:
(1) historically, individuals with disabilities have been isolated and
subjected to discrimination and such isolation and discrimination is
still pervasive in our society;
(2) discrimination still persists in such critical areas as employment
in the private sector, public accommodations, public services, trans-
portation, and telecommunications;
(3) current Federal and State laws are inadequate to address the
discrimination faced by people with disabilities in these critical
areas;
(4) people with disabilities as a group occupy an inferior status so-
cially, economically, vocationally, and educationally; and
(5) discrimination denies people with disabilities the opportunity
to compete on an equal basis with others and costs the United
States, State and local governments, and the private sector billions
of dollars in unnecessary expenses resulting from dependency and
non-productivity.
Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12,101(a) (Supp. III 1991) (containing congressional find-
ings and purpose of the ADA).
9 H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 32, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 314.
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ifjobs were made available.' 0 Accordingly, with the adop-
tion of the ADA, an untapped reservoir of workers will be
entitled to equal opportunities in the job market.
This comment will discuss the legal effects and the
scope of the ADA. It will outline important changes fac-
ing the airlines in hiring procedures of cockpit personnel
and flight attendants. Part I discusses the purposes and
congressional goals in enacting the ADA; scrutinizes rele-
vant case law from the Rehabilitation Act of 1973; and
provides an overview of the ADA's legal requirements for
reasonable accommodations, undue burden, and essential
functions by evaluating the statutory provisions and regu-
lations subsequently promulgated by the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Part I also
discusses issues surrounding disabled workers and the
risk of harm and defines which disabilities are covered by
the ADA. Part II applies the ADA to current airline em-
ployment practices for pilots and flight attendants, focus-
ing on medical examinations and the Human
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV). Part III summarizes the
ADA's legal requirements.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE ADA
Title I of the ADA sets out the legal requirements and
the scope of the ADA for employment purposes. " Stated
generally, this title of the ADA prohibits a covered entity' 2
from discriminating against a qualified individual with a
disability' 3 in the job application process, the hiring, the
10 Id.
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,111-12,117 (Supp. III 1991).
12 42 U.S.C. § 12,111(2) (Supp. III 1991) (defining the term "covered entity" as
an employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management
committee). Id. Section 12,111(5)(A) defines employer. The ADA defines two
classes of employers. The first phase of the ADA, effective two years after the
effective date of the ADA (July 26, 1992), includes employers who employ 25 or
more employees "for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in
the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such person." Id. The
second phase, effective July 26, 1994, lowers the number of employees to 15. 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(e) (1993).
,3 42 U.S.C. § 12,111(8) (Supp. 111 1991). This section defines "qualified indi-
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advancement, or the discharge of employees, and in other
aspects of employment.' 4 An important inquiry in deter-
mining discrimination is an employer's failure to make
reasonable accommodations for the disabled employee. 15
The term "reasonable accommodations" includes modifi-
cation of existing facilities to allow access and use by dis-
abled individuals.' 6 Additionally, the employer may be
required to redefine or modify job responsibilities.' 7
Congress provided for the implementation of the ADA,
and attempted to quiet the fears of increased ADA litiga-
tion, "'8 by specifically adopting, wherever consistent, cur-
rent standards developed under the Rehabilitation Act.' 9
The Rehabilitation Act first adopted the concept of rea-
sonable accommodations.
The first issue under the ADA analysis is whether an
individual has a disability as defined in the Act or in regu-
lations promulgated by the EEOC. The second issue is
whether that individual can perform the essential func-
tions of the position. If the individual cannot perform the
vidual with a disability" as "an individual with a disability who, with or without
reasonable accommodations, can perform the essential functions of the employ-
ment position that such individual holds or desires." Id. Additionally, this section
considers the employer's estimation of essential job functions, and considers writ-
ten job descriptions as evidence of this estimation. Id.
,4 Id. § 12,112(a).
15 Id. § 12,111(9).
16 See H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 57, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 339.
17 42 U.S.C. § 12,111(9)(A)-(B) (Supp. III 1991).
18 This goal has to date failed. The EEOC reported that ADA filings have ex-
ceeded initial projections and are growing at a steady rate. BNA Daily Labor Re-
port, Current Developments Section (Mar. 29, 1993). In addition, ADA cases now
account for approximately 13% of the EEOC's caseload. Id.
19 29 U.S.C. §§ 790-940 (1988). Congress explicitly adopted the applicable
reasonable accommodation standards of the Rehabilitation Act to apply to the
ADA. H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 23, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 304. Because of the extensive efforts undertaken by the legis-
lative and executive branches in developing the ADA, "[ffears that the ADA is too
vague or too costly and will lead to an explosion of litigation are misplaced ....
Employers can turn to [interpretations of the Rehabilitation Act] for guidance on
how to meet their obligations under the ADA." Statement of President George
Bush Upon Signing S. 933, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 601 (July 30, 1990).
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essential functions, the final inquiry is whether the em-
ployer can provide reasonable accommodations.
A. DETERMINING DISABILITIES UNDER THE ADA
Congress used the term disabled individual in the ADA
instead of handicapped individual, which was used in the
Rehabilitation Act. This change in terminology repre-
sents Congressional intent to destroy stereotypical and
emotional barriers that face the disabled and the choice of
disability groups.2 0 The two terms have essentially the
same meaning under each statute, but Congress made the
change to signal a change in attitude toward the dis-
abled. 2' In keeping with its policy to mirror the Rehabili-
tation Act whenever possible, Congress adopted its
definition for disability, although the ADA contains
slightly different phraseology.2 2 Under the ADA, the term
disability covers a broad range of physical and mental
impairments.23
In order to satisfy the statutory requirement of an indi-
vidual with a disability, an individual must satisfy one part
of a three element test: (1) "a physical or mental impair-
ment that substantially limits one or more of the major
20 H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 50-51, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 332-33. Further, the ADA protects from discrimination per-
sons who associate with individuals who have a disability. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12,112(b)(4) (Supp. III 1991) (defining discrimination as "excluding or other-
wise denying equal jobs or benefits to a qualified individual because of the known
disability of an individual with whom the qualified individual is known to have a
relationship or association"). Congress discovered that family members of the
disabled often experience discrimination and confinement similar to that of the
disabled. H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 61, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 343-44. The ADA prohibits uninformed or biased assump-
tions concerning ability to perform the job. Id. The ADA, however, does not
require employers to provide reasonable accommodations for the family member.
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 343-44. Additionally, if the employee fails to adequately
perform a job because of the disabled relation, the employer may dismiss the em-
ployee. Id.
21 See H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 50, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 332-33.
22 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630 app. (1993) (explaining § 1630.2(g)).
23 See Francis M. Dougherty, Annotation, Who is "Individual with Handicaps"
Under Rehabilitation Act of 1923 (29 U.S.C.S. §§ 701 etseq), 97 A.L.R. FED. 40 (1990)
(discussing disabilities under the Rehabilitation Act).
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life activities of such individual; ' 24 (2) "a record of such
impairment; ' 25 or (3) "being regarded as having such an
impairment. ' 26  This determination requires a fact spe-
cific inquiry into the nature of the individual's disability.
Temporary afflictions such as broken bones, strained
muscles, or nonchronic diseases fail the substantially lim-
iting test and do not qualify as disabilities.27
An employer's evaluation of a physical or mental im-
pairment under the first part of the test is conducted with-
out consideration of the effect of mitigating devices such
as hearing aids and prosthetic devices. 8 Normal physical
characteristics, such as height or weight, which are not the
result of psychological disorders do not qualify as disabili-
ties.29 If an individual is limited in one or more major life
activities, defined as "activities that the average person in
the general population can perform with little or no diffi-
culty," the ADA considers that person a disabled individ-
ual." Whether the disability substantially limits the
disabled depends on more than the name attached to the
affliction. Employers must engage in a case-by-case in-
quiry to determine the actual effect on the individual.3'
The second element of the definition of disability is sat-
isfied by producing medical, educational, or other records
that show a history of an impairment substantially limiting
a major life activity.3 This section of the test protects an
24 42 U.S.C. § 12,102(2)(A) (Supp. III 1991).
25 Id. § 12,102(2)(B).
26 Id. § 12,102(2)(A)-(C).
27 29 C.F.R. § 1630 app. (1993).
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) for examples of major life activities. The list
includes walking, talking, motor skills, breathing, learning, and working. Id.
31 29 C.F.R. § 1630 app. (1993). Some disabilities, such as complications from
AIDS, are inherently limiting to major life activities. Id. Factors to consider in-
clude, but are not limited to, the following: "(1) the nature and severity of the
impairment, (2) the duration or expected duration of the impairment, and (3) the
permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long term impact
of, or resulting from, the impairment." Id.
32 Id. Individuals classified as disabled under statutes with differing definitions
of disabled, however, do not necessarily qualify as disabled under the ADA. Id.
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individual exhibiting a long history of a limiting disability
from discrimination.
The third part of the test is the broadest and protects
individuals from prejudice and bias that employers may
have toward a certain disability. If the individual is per-
ceived by others to have a substantially limiting disability
when in fact the disability only partially limits the person's
major life activity, that condition is considered to be a dis-
ability under the ADA.33 The individual may satisfy the
third part of the test if the individual does not have an
impairment but is regarded as having one. 4
B. REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS UNDER THE
REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973
This section of the comment discusses reasonable ac-
commodations under the Rehabilitation Act and examines
case law from that statute focusing on the specific require-
ments of reasonable accommodations under the ADA.
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 intro-
duced the legal concept of reasonable accommodations to
American labor law.3 5 Since 1973, the courts have devel-
oped a significant body of case law that outlines the re-
quirements of reasonable accommodations. Because the
ADA specifically adopts section 504 case law, this com-
ment section discusses the major cases under the Rehabil-
itation Act, and develops the modern theory of reasonable
accommodation.
The Rehabilitation Act requires an employer to make
reasonable accommodations in the work place that allow
otherwise qualified employees to perform essential job
33 Id.
54 Id. For example, if an employer reassigns an individual with a controlled
high blood pressure to a less strenuous position because of unsubstantiated fears
of heart attack, the employer is considered to have regarded that person as dis-
abled. Additionally, an employer who discriminates against a disfigured or
scarred employee because of fears of negative customer reactions has regarded
the employee as disabled and has acted improperly. Id.
35 See 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(l) (1988) for the requirement of reasonable accom-
modations under the Rehabilitation Act.
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functions.36 The goal of section 504 is to provide equal
opportunity to handicapped employees and to destroy
surmountable barriers that face disabled workers on the
job. It is important to understand that the statutory re-
quirement to provide reasonable accommodations is not
equivalent to an affirmative action program.
Regulations promulgated under the Rehabilitation Act
provide examples of the types of reasonable accommoda-
tions contemplated under the ADA.37 These include the
modification of facilities and the restructuring of work re-
quirements38 to provide accessibility to handicapped per-
sons. The regulations indicate that the list was not
intended to be exhaustive and only provides examples of
possible accommodations.3 9 An employer is not required
to accommodate a handicapped worker if the required
changes would impose an undue hardship on the em-
ployer.40 EEOC regulations require employers to con-
sider several factors, which are set forth in the
regulations, to determine whether an accommodation
would pose an undue hardship. 4' This determination re-
quires a specific inquiry based on the individual facts and
circumstances that surround each case.42
This requirement illustrates the goal of reasonable ac-
commodations: to ensure equal opportunity to the dis-
abled rather than requiring employers to develop
affirmative action programs. In contrast, affirmative ac-
36 Id.
97 See 29 C.F.R. § 1613.704 (1993).
18 Id. § 1613.704(b). Changing work requirements is a broad term that includes
the following: "job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, acquisi-
tion or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifica-
tion of examinations, the provision of readers and interpreters, and other similar
actions." Id.
-9 Id. § 1613.704.
40 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(l) (1988).
41 29 C.F.R. § 1613.704(c) (1993). Factors that an employer must consider are:
(1) the size of the employer's business, including number of employees, types of
facilities, and overall budget; (2) the composition and structure of the work force;
and (3) the requirements of the proposed accommodation, and its total cost. Id.
42 Hall v. United States Postal Serv., 857 F.2d 1073, 1079-80 (6th Cir. 1988); see
also 29 C.F.R. § 1630 app. (1993).
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tion would require employers to actively seek out and in-
crease the numbers of disabled employees, set lower
threshold testing requirements for the group, or to dedi-
cate a specified number of positions to disabled employ-
ees.4" The reasonable accommodations requirement
provides equal opportunity to the disabled while encour-
aging employers to remove existing and future barriers to
disabled workers.44 Employers are to evaluate a disabled
worker in relation only to the essential functions of the
position sought.4 5 If the worker is unable to perform the
essential functions of the position, the employer must
then determine whether reasonable accommodations
would allow that disabled worker to perform these func-
tions. Reasonable accommodations are defined as those
which do not impose an undue hardship. Employers are
not required to change the essential nature of the job in
order to hire disabled workers.4"
Employers may choose a nondisabled worker over a dis-
abled one for legitimate reasons unrelated to the disabil-
ity facing the disabled worker.4 7  For example, if two
candidates for a secretarial job have different typing
speeds, the employer is free to choose the applicant with
the higher typing speed if higher typing speed is an essen-
tial function of the job.4 8 If a hearing-impaired applicant
43 UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM OF
INDIVIDUAL ABILITIES 156 (1983). For a thorough discussion of the distinction
between reasonable accommodations and affirmative action see Jeffrey 0.
Cooper, Overcoming Barriers of Employment: The Meaning of Reasonable Accommodation
and Undue Hardship in the Americans with Disabilities Act, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1423
(1991).
44 The Supreme Court addressed this confusing distinction in Alexander v.
Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 300 (1985), by stating that affirmative action refers "to a
remedial policy for the victims of past discrimination, while [reasonable accommo-
dations] relates to the elimination of existing obstacles against the handicapped."
Id. at 300 n.20.
45 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (1993); see id. § 1630.2(n) (for determination of essen-
tial functions).
16 See Strathie v. Department of Transp., 716 F.2d 227, 230 (3d Cir. 1983) (find-
ing an accommodation unreasonable if the employer must change the essential
function of the position or if the accommodation imposes undue costs).
47 29 C.F.R. § 1630 app. (1993).
48 Id.
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and a candidate without a disability with the same typing
speed apply for the job, however, the employer may not
discriminate against the hearing-impaired individual
solely because a reasonable accommodation may be re-
quired to enable the disabled individual to perform the
job.49
The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of reason-
able accommodations in Southeastern Community College v.
Davis. 50 In that case a nursing program denied admission
to Davis, a hearing impaired nursing candidate. The
Court determined that the candidate failed to meet all the
requirements of the position because her hearing disor-
der prevented her from effectively communicating with
instructors and patients. 5' In reaching its decision, the
Court determined that the regulations did not require the
college to make extensive and costly modifications to its
program in order to benefit Davis.52 Additionally, the
Court stated that "[s]ection 504 does not refer at all to
affirmative action," and that failure to make accommoda-
tions, by itself, does not indicate discrimination.53 The
Court noted, however, that "situations may arise where a
refusal to modify an existing program might become un-
reasonable and discriminatory. '54
In Alexander v. Choate55 the Court again addressed the
issue of reasonable accommodations. Acknowledging
criticism of the Court's failure to clarify the differences
between affirmative action and reasonable accommoda-
tions in Davis, the Alexander Court helped clarify the dis-
49 Id.; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9 (1993).
-o 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
5, Id. at 407.
52 Id. at 410-11. The Court acknowledged the difficulty of determining the dis-
tinction between a discriminatory refusal to provide accommodations and a legal
right to do so. Id. at 412. As technology advances, however, it will be possible to
provide accommodations to greater numbers of otherwise qualified individuals
without imposing excessive costs and administrative burdens upon employers. Id.
53 Id. at 410-12.
54 Id. at 412-13.
5- 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
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tinction. 56  Affirmative action refers to "'changes,'
'adjustments,' or 'modifications' to existing programs that
would be 'substantial' or that would constitute 'funda-
mental [alterations] in the nature of a program,' rather
than to those changes that would be reasonable accom-
modations. ' 57 The decision in Alexander helps clarify the
important distinctions between an affirmative action and
an equal opportunity program and aids in the implemen-
tation of the ADA.
In School Board v. Arline58 the Court provided further
guidance on the duty to provide reasonable accommoda-
tions. The Court reinforced its previous holdings in Davis
and Alexander, and clarified that the requirement of rea-
sonable accommodations is not affirmative action:
Employers have an affirmative obligation to make a rea-
sonable accommodation for a handicapped employee.
Although they are not required to find another job for an
employee who is not qualified for the job he or she was
doing, they cannot deny an employee alternative employ-
ment opportunities reasonably available under the em-
ployer's existing policies.5"
This decision sharpened the distinction between affirma-
tive action and the affirmative obligation to provide rea-
sonable accommodations. By the Supreme Court's own
admission, the distinction is not always clear,60 but the
concept of reasonable accommodations is an important
element in achieving the goals of the ADA by removing
the barriers to employment that face otherwise qualified
disabled Americans.
C. REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS UNDER THE ADA
This section will examine the legal obligations under
- Id. at 300 n.20; see Donald J. Olenick, Note, Accommodating the Handicapped:
Rehabilitating Section 504 After Southeastern, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 171, 185-86 (1980).
-7 Alexander, 469 U.S. at 300 (citations omitted).
- 480 U.S. 273 (1986).
59 Id. at 289 n.19.
-0 Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 412 (1979).
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the ADA by determining when an employer must provide
reasonable accommodations. The section then discusses
the undue burden analysis of the ADA. Finally, the sec-
tion examines how to determine the essential functions of
the position.
The requirements of reasonable accommodations as set
forth above carry over to the ADA. 6' The legislative his-
tory of the ADA clarifies Congressional intent that the
ADA adopt the existing standards for reasonable accom-
modations developed under the Rehabilitation Act.62
Ambiguities that existed under the Rehabilitation Act,
however, are also carried over.6 3
The ADA obligates employers to determine whether a
reasonable accommodation would allow an otherwise
qualified disabled employee to perform a job.64 An em-
ployer's failure to make this determination or refusal to
provide reasonable accommodations is considered illegal
discriminatory behavior under the ADA. 65 The ADA pro-
vides two exceptions to the reasonable accommodations
requirement. The first exception is that unless the em-
ployee is a qualified individual with a disability as defined
by the ADA, employers need not consider reasonable ac-
commodations. 66 The second is that an employer is not
required to provide accommodations that would result in
undue hardship to the employer.67
61 See supra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
62 See H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 23, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 304; see also Statement of President George Bush, supra note 4.
63 David Rubenstein, The Americans with Disabilities Act; What 43 Million New Poten-
tial Plaintiffs Will Mean, ILL. LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 1990, at 1.
See 29 C.F.R. § 1630 app. (1993).
65 42 U.S.C. § 12,112(b)(5)(A)-(B) (Supp. III 1991). The Committee on Educa-
tion and Labor stated that the requirement of reasonable accommodations is a
"key requirement of the Rehabilitation Act and of this Act." H.R. REP. No. 485,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 33, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 315.
- 42 U.S.C. § 12,112(b)(5)(A) (Supp. III 1991). The ADA defines qualified
individual with a disability as "an individual with a disability who, with or without
reasonable accommodations, can perform the essential functions of the employ-
ment position that such individual holds or desires." Id. § 12,111(8).
67 Id. § 12,112(b)(5)(A).
[59
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1. When are Reasonable Accommodations Required?
The ADA does not explicitly define reasonable accom-
modations; rather the statute provides examples of the
types of accommodations an employer must consider.68
Modeled after the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA requires
employers to improve accessibility and usability of facili-
ties through modification, to make changes in the nature
of a job, and to provide devices to enable disabled work-
ers to perform the essential functions of a job.6 9 Because
the statutory requirements are not exhaustive, employers
must perform highly individualized and fact specific in-
quiries into the nature and types of accommodations that
a particular disabled worker may require.7 °
Examples of required job restructuring or alteration of
an essential job function include modifying work hours or
computerizing records normally maintained manually.7 '
The EEOC considers reassignment of an employee from
one position to another an option of last resort.7 2 Reas-
- Id. § 12,111(9).
- Id. § 12,111(9)(A)-(B). The ADA states that:
"reasonable accommodations" may include making existing facilities
used by employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals
with disabilities; and job restructuring, part-time or modified work
schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modifi-
cation of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifica-
tions of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of
qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations
for individuals with disabilities.
Id.
70 Congress stated that the statutory list of reasonable accommodations was not
a complete one. H.R. REP. No. 485, 10 1st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 62, reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 344. Instead, the list is:
intended to provided general guidance about the nature of the obli-
gation. Furthermore, the list is not meant to suggest that employers
must follow all the actions listed in each particular case. Rather, the
decision as to what reasonable accommodation is appropriate is one
which must be determined based on the particular facts of the indi-
vidual case. This fact specific, case-by-case approach to providing
reasonable accommodations is generally consistent with interpreta-
tions of this phrase under ... the Rehabilitation Act.
Id.
71 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630 app. (1993).
72 Id.
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signment is generally required only for current employ-
ees. 7 3  If reassignment is required, employers cannot
force employees to accept reassignment to undesirable
positions or facilities.74
2. The Undue Burden Analysis
When drafting the ADA, Congress recognized the po-
tentially high costs of accommodating disabled workers
and intended that private employers bear the costs of pro-
viding equal opportunity to disabled workers. 75 The un-
due hardship limitation, however, contains two exceptions
to providing an accommodation in anticipation of finan-
cial difficulties that employers may experience.76 These
two exceptions are: (1) undue burden analysis; and (2) the
essential functions inquiry.
In order to determine whether a given accommodation
imposes an undue hardship, employers may look to con-
gressional intent, regulations written by the EEOC, and
guidance from the Rehabilitation Act. 77 An accommoda-
tion will pose an undue financial hardship if five factors
are satisfied. These factors are as follows: (1) the cost of
the accommodation taking into account outside funding
and tax deductions; (2) the total financial resources of the
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 See H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 67-68, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 349-50.
76 Originally, Congress considered a much stricter standard: an unreasonable
accommodation was one that threatened the continued existence of an employer's
business. See Bonnie P. Tucker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: An Overview,
1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 923, 927. Congress adopted the current definition of undue
hardship as a result of protests from the private sector. Id. The legislative history
states that an undue hardship is "an action that is unduly costly, extensive, sub-
stantial, disruptive, or that will fundamentally alter the nature of the program."
H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 67, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 330, 349. Congress explicitly rejected the lesser standard required
under Title VII accommodations for religious beliefs adopted in TWA v. Hardi-
son, 432 U.S. 63 (1977) (holding that accommodations that require more than a
de minimus cost are not required). 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 350.
77 See H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 68, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 350; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(q) (1993) (defining undue hardship);
id. § 1630 app.
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facility including the total number of employees and the
effect of the facilities resources; (3) the complete re-
sources of the company taking into account the overall
size of the business and the total number of facilities oper-
ated by the company; (4) the type of operation of the com-
pany considering the size and structure of its workforce
and the geographical relationship between its facilities;
and (5) the effect of the accommodation on the individual
facility including any potential impairment to employees
performing their duties.78 The factors focus on the indi-
vidual employer's ability to bear the costs of the accom-
modation and avoid generic requirements of reasonable
accommodations. Under this individualized, case-by-case
determination, an accommodation that is reasonable for
one employer may prove to be an undue hardship for
another.79
Nelson v. Thornburgh, °8 0 a case decided under the Rehabil-
itation Act, explains the undue hardship analysis. In Nel-
son a blind Department of Public Welfare (DPW)
employee brought a class action suit against the state of
Pennsylvania under the Rehabilitation Act, alleging dis-
criminatory action for failure to provide sighted readers
as an accommodation. Before bringing the suit Nelson
paid for the readers with funding received from social se-
curity benefits. The court analyzed four proposed accom-
modations: transposing forms into braille; printing
manuals in braille; providing mini-computers to translate
braille; and providing readers.8 ' The court determined
that DPW failed to carry the burden of proving that Nel-
son's proposed accommodation presented an undue
hardship.8 2 The court applied the five factor test and con-
78 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(2) (1993).
79 See H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 70, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 352. For example, a neighborhood store, lacking the financial
resources of a national chain, carries a lesser burden in proving undue hardship if
loss of jobs or closing the business could result from adopting the accommoda-
tions. Id. pt. 3, at 40-41, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 463.
o 567 F. Supp. 369 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
81 Id. at 375.
812 Id. at 380.
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cluded that the cost of hiring readers was modest.8 3 The
court compared the cost of readers to the department's
$300 million budget, the fact that many other employees
could benefit from the program, and noted that DPW
could implement the program with little disruption to
present services.84 The court therefore concluded that
the readers were a reasonable accommodation.85
To successfully challenge the duty to provide accommo-
dations under the undue hardship exception, the em-
ployer must show that the costs of accommodations would
threaten the business's ability to maintain current produc-
tion.86  The employer cannot rely solely on increased
budgetary problems.87 Unfortunately, employers are pro-
vided little guidance to determine whether a given accom-
modation imposes an undue hardship. 88 This potentially
costly and time-consuming endeavor to individually de-
terminate each potential accommodation, represents one
of the more difficult aspects of implementing the ADA.
Employers must carefully consider the factors in light of
each individual situation and rely as much as possible on
guidance from Congress and decisions from the Rehabili-
tation Act.
83 Id.
- Id. The court acknowledged the budget problems plaguing the state and
conceded that an additional financial burden would be imposed with the decision.
Id. The court, however, also recognized Congress's intent to provide equal op-
portunities to disabled workers. Id. The court believed that the social costs of not
providing employment opportunities to the disabled far outweighed the burdens
imposed by the required reasonable accommodations. Id.
85 Id.
86 Nelson, 567 F. Supp. at 380; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630 app. (1993).
87 29 C.F.R. § 1630 app. (1993).
8 An additional difficulty arises in the area of health benefit plans. Although
the ADA places prohibitions on medical examinations, those restrictions do not
apply to health insurers when classifying risks. 42 U.S.C. § 12,112(d) (Supp. III
1991). Accordingly, the ADA may require an employer to hire a disabled worker
who is refused coverage under the employer's health benefits insurance program,
thereby forcing the employer to cover the additional medical insurance costs or
consent to increased rates. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.5, 1630.16(o app. (1993). The is-
sue of whether inflated medical insurance rates present an undue hardship is un-
resolved. Rubenstein, supra note 63, at 1.
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3. Determining Essential Functions of the Position
The second limitation to the duty of providing reason-
able accommodations is that the disabled employee must
be capable of performing the essential functions of the
position, with or without reasonable accommodations.89
The essential function limitation is consistent with the
congressional mandate to provide equal opportunity to
the disabled. 90 Essential functions are defined as those
"job tasks that are fundamental and not marginal." 9' Em-
ployers must consider whether an employee can perform
the essential functions at the time of request or applica-
tion. Employers, however, may not discriminate based on
potential future disabilities.92
The EEOC has provided guidance to employers in de-
termining essential job functions in the form of a list of
factors that find a function essential if:
the reason the position exists is to perform that function,
...the limited number of employees available among
whom the performance of that job function can be distrib-
uted... [or] the function may be so highly specialized that
the incumbent in the position is hired for his or her exper-
tise or ability to perform the particular function.9"
89 42 U.S.C. § 12,111(8) (Supp. III 1991).
9 See supra notes 43-60 and accompanying text discussing the distinction be-
tween affirmative action and reasonable accommodation.
91 H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 55, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 337. Congress adopted this definition to "ensure that employ-
ers can continue to require that all applicants and employees, including those with
disabilities, are able to perform the essential, i.e., non-marginal functions of the
job in question." Id. For example, a policy that requires employees to hold driv-
ers licenses, if driving is not part of the job, is a marginal requirement, and em-
ployers cannot exclude a disabled worker who could otherwise perform the
essential functions. Id. However, Congress clearly stated its intent to allow em-
ployers to hire qualified workers, so long as employers fairly consider qualified
disabled individuals. Id.
92 See H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 53, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 357.
93 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n) (1993); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12,112(a)-(b) (Supp. III
1991). When considering ajob applicant, an employer could accommodate a dis-
abled worker by reassigning marginal or nonessential job functions to other em-
ployees. 29 C.F.R. § 1630 app. (1993). The employer is not, however, required
to reallocate essential functions of the job. Id. For example, the EEOC hypothe-
sized that the ADA would not require an employer to provide a sighted reader to a
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Regulations issued pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act and
cases decided under that Act provide additional insight
into the procedure for determining whether a function is
an essential one.94 Additional factors under the ADA in-
clude the following: the employer's judgment of the es-
sential nature of the function based on evidence such as
written job descriptions; the amount of time required to
perform the function; and past and current experiences
of employees performing the same function. 95 The initial
inquiry requires the employer to determine whether em-
ployees actually perform the suggested essential function.
An illusory or paper only written description will not pro-
vide sufficient justification for the definition of an activity
as an essential function. 96
An employer must then determine whether modifying
the job description changes the basic nature of the job.9 7
Under the Rehabilitation Act, the obligation to provide
opportunities to the handicapped does not require em-
ployers to alter the essential nature of their business.98
visually impaired security guard, since checking identification cards and other ac-
tivities that require vision are essential functions. Id. If required to provide such
an accommodation, the reader assistant, rather than the disabled security guard,
would be performing the essential nature of the position. Id.
9 See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3) (1993); School Board v. Arline, 480 U.S.
273 (1987); Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979); Hall
v. United States Postal Serv., 857 F.2d 1073 (6th Cir. 1988); Nelson v. Thorn-
burgh, 567 F. Supp. 369 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
95 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3) (1993). This list of factors represents examples of
the inquiry required under the ADA. Id. Employers must determine essential
functions on a case-by-case basis, and employers may use all relevant evidence in
making this determination. Id. § 1630 app. However, the regulations instruct the
courts to place more weight on the factors listed. Id. This presents another diffi-
culty with the ADA. Because of the loose requirements outlined by Congress and
the EEOC, the remaining uncertainty will prove costly and impose risks of
litigation.
I d. § 1630.2 app.
97 Id.
98 See Southeastern Community College, 442 U.S. at 410. In that case, accommodat-
ing a hearing-impaired student would fundamentally alter the nature of South-
eastern's training program and, therefore, refusal to modify is not required. Id. at
397. The strict standard set in Southeastern required Davis to qualify "all of a pro-
gram's requirements in spite of this handicap." Id. at 405. The Court imposed
this strict standard because of the unique physical and safety standards expected
in the nursing profession. Id. at 397, 413.
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The ADA, however, requires a highly individualized and
fact-specific inquiry on a case-by-case basis.99 Employers
may discover therefore that the ADA may require more
changes in job functions than were required under the
Rehabilitation Act.
The ADA does not require employers to develop writ-
ten job descriptions for each position. Because courts are
required to defer to employers' job requirements if the
description represents an accurate portrayal of the essen-
tial functions, the ADA encourages employers to develop
written descriptions. 00 The Sixth Circuit addressed the
issue of the weight afforded an employer's written job de-
scription under the Rehabilitation Act in Hall v. United
States Postal Service.' 0' As a result of a back injury, Hall re-
quested reassignment from her letter carrier position to
that of a distribution clerk. The written job description
for the distribution clerk position required heavy lifting
and frequent bending and kneeling. The employer found
Hall medically unsuitable for the job during the applica-
tion process because she could not perform the lifting re-
quirements. The Sixth Circuit rejected the district court's
conclusion that the employer's job description con-
trolled. 0 2 Instead, the court determined that a highly fact
specific determination must be conducted by the court to
decide whether the written descriptions accurately reflect
the actual requirements of the job. 0 3 The Sixth Circuit
also noted that the district court had failed to determine
See Arline, 480 U.S. at 287-89 (remanding the case for a specific inquiry into
Arline's contagious disease).
-0 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 app. (1993). The EEOC stated that "the inquiry into
essential functions is not intended to second guess an employer's business judg-
ment with regard to production standards, whether qualitative or quantitative, nor
to require employers to lower such standards." Id. If an employer establishes
defined production rates, additional justification will not be required, if the em-
ployer proves that the standards are actually imposed on its workers. Id. If, how-
ever, the disabled employee alleges that the employer chose a particular
numerical standard in order to discriminate against the applicant, the employer
must present a nondiscriminatory justification. Id.
10, 857 F.2d 1073 (6th Cir. 1988).
102 Id. at 1079.
los Id.
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whether reasonable accommodations would permit Hall
to perform the function. 0 4 The court remanded the case
to the district court with instructions to make a specific
inquiry into the essential nature of the lifting requirement
and to determine whether a reasonable accommodation
existed. 105
In Nelson v. Thornburgh'0 6 the court determined that a
visually impaired social worker who performed his job
with the aid of sighted readers was qualified to perform
the essential functions of the job if the State provided rea-
sonable accommodations. 10 7 The accommodation of pro-
viding a sighted reader did not require reassignment of an
essential function and was therefore reasonable. 0 8 The
State did not hire the social worker for his seeing ability,
rather for other skills including client counseling and
processing. In this case, the court determined that the es-
sential function of the job was not vision, but instead the
ability to determine whether clients qualified for federal
and state benefits. 10 9
D. DISABLED WORKERS AND THE RISK OF HARM UNDER
THE ADA
Concerns about risks that disabled individuals may im-
pose upon third parties have been found to present legiti-
mate considerations in today's world of widespread tort
litigation. This is particularly the case in the airline indus-
try where safety is of paramount concern because acci-
dents may result in large scale catastrophes."t 0 Congress
considered these questions when developing the ADA. A
direct threat to others is a defense to alleged discrimina-
104 Id.
105 Id. at 1080.
-o6 567 F. Supp. 369 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
107 Id. at 379.
108 Id.
1 9 Id. at 372.
11o See 49 U.S.C. § 1421(b) (1988) (stating the airline's statutory duty to operate
with the highest degree of safety).
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tion under the premise of legitimate business necessity."'
Although safety considerations are a part of business ne-
cessity and therefore a defense to discrimination, the in-
quiry requires a highly individualized and fact-specific
study, conducted on a case-by-case basis." 2
The EEOC has also promulgated regulations address-
ing this issue under the ADA." 3 These regulations pro-
vide that under the rubric of a business necessity,
employers may establish qualification standards that "in-
clude a requirement that an individual shall not pose a
direct threat to the health or safety of the individual or
others in the workplace." '" 4 The ADA does not require
airlines to hire a visually impaired pilot or a flight attend-
ant confined to a wheelchair because of the unnecessary
risk of harm. The ADA does place limitations, however,
upon an employer's ability to test or screen for disabilities
in the pre-offer context." 5 As a result, employers must
consider the actual threat to third parties and avoid ste-
reotypes and misconceptions of an individuals disabil-
ity." 6 The ADA direct threat standard is defined as a
"significant risk to the health or safety of others that can-
not be eliminated by reasonable accommodation." '" 7 By
adopting the direct threat standard Congress meant to
i" 42 U.S.C. § 12,113(b) (Supp. III 1991); see H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 3, at 45, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 468.
112 Id.; see also Bryan P. Neal, Comment, The Proper Standard for Risk of Future
Injury Under the Americans with Disabilities Act: Risk to Self or Risk to Others, 46 SMU L.
REV. 483 (1992).
,, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (1993). A "direct threat" is defined as:
[A] significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the
individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reason-
able accommodation. The determination that an individual poses a
"direct threat" shall be based on an individualized assessment of the
individual's present ability to safely perform the essential functions
of the job.
Id.
I14 Id. § 1630.15(b)(2).
1- See 42 U.S.C. § 12,112(d) (Supp. III 1991) and discussion infra part II.A.
116 See H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 45, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 468.
117 42 U.S.C. § 12,111(3) (Supp. III 1991). Regulations promulgated by the
EEOC require an "individualized assessment of the individual's present ability to
safely perform the essential functions of the job." 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(r) (1993).
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eliminate determinations that an employee was a danger
to others which were not based on "objective evidence
about the individual involved."" 8 An "elevated risk of in-
jury" which is not based on "actual proof of a significant
risk to others" is therefore insufficient to satisfy the direct
threat test." 9 This standard represents Congress's intent
to remove discriminatory barriers based on fears and ste-
reotypes lacking an objective and factual basis. The direct
threat test requires employers to conduct highly individu-
alized and fact-specific inquires into the nature of an indi-
vidual's disabilities, as well as the objective, individualized
threat of harm to third parties. If, after an objective eval-
uation an employer determines that an individual will
pose a significant, direct threat to others, the employer
must then consider whether reasonable accommodations
will minimize that risk.' 20
In addition, the ADA provides that the significant, di-
rect threat must be to others, not to the employee.'
2
'
Additionally, the regulation sets forth the following factors to evaluate a direct
risk:
(1) The duration of the risk;
(2) The nature and severity of the potential harm;
(3) The likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and
(4) The imminence of the potential harm.
Id.
118 See 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 468-69. For example, an employer must evaluate
the risk of a direct threat to others in terms of "the behavior of the particular
disabled person, not merely on generalizations about the disability." H.R. REP.
No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, 56-57, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,
338-39.
119 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 469.
120 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (1993); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12,112(b)(5)(A)-(B) (Supp.
III 1991); 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 356.
12, 42 U.S.C. § 12,111(3) (Supp. III 1991); see 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 356.
Although the legislative history has indicated that the risk to self is not a factor,
EEOC regulations manifest a different intent. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(b)(2)
(1993). Disability groups argued that the EEOC standard perpetuated stereotypi-
cal attitudes explicitly rejected in the legislative history. Equal Employment Op-
portunity for Individuals with Disabilities, Advanced Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 55 Fed. Reg. 35,726, 35,730 (1991) (including interpretive commen-
tary on the ADA). Unfortunately, the courts will be the final arbiter of this issue.
See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 843 n.9 (1984) (stating "[t]he judiciary is the final authority on issues of stat-
utory construction and must reject administrative constructions which are con-
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Thus, an employer may not base hiring decisions on pa-
ternalistic views of what is best for the employee. Instead
the employee, if otherwise capable of performing the job
and not a significant risk to others, is entitled to decide
what is in her own best interests. 22 Overprotection of the
disabled based on misinformation is perhaps the greatest
barrier standing between the disabled and equal opportu-
nities in society. 2 1 Congress explicitly stated that dis-
abled Americans "continually encounter various forms of
discrimination, including . . . overprotective rules and
policies."' 12
4
Cases interpreting the Rehabilitation Act provide addi-
tional guidance in this area. In Mantolete v. Bolger'2 5 a job
applicant suffering from epilepsy alleged discriminatory
hiring practices by the United States Postal Service
(USPS). Fearing that Mantolete's disability would pose a
risk to others, the USPS had refused to hire her. The
Ninth Circuit held that an objective evaluation of the po-
tential threat based on the individual's past medical and
work history was required. 2 6 The court rejected the em-
ployer's conclusion that a risk to others existed because
trary to clear congressional intent"). In General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S.
125, 143-45 (1976) the Court refused to enforce EEOC regulations regarding
employee benefits for pregnancy related disabilities. Id.; see also Dalheim v.
KDFW-TV, 706 F. Supp. 493 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (refuting Department of Labor
wage and hour regulations), afd, 918 F.2d 1220 (5th Cir. 1990).
In Chevron the Court announced a two-step test to check the validity of an
agency regulation. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. First, the court must determine
whether Congress has clearly articulated its intent on the "precise question at
issue." Id. If clear congressional intent exists, the test is complete and both the
courts and the agency are bound by that intent. Id. at 842-43. If Congress is
silent or an ambiguity exists, the second step of the test questions whether the
agency's regulation is based on a permissible interpretation of the statute. Id. at
843, 845.
122 H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, 74, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 356; Bentivegna v. United States Dep't of Labor, 694 F.2d
619, 623 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that employers may not discriminate based on
generalized fears of the effects of stress on an individual's disability).
123 See 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 356.
124 42 U.S.C. § 12,101(a)(5) (Supp. III 1991) (conveying Congressional findings
and purposes of the ADA).
'12 767 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1985).
16 Id. at 1422.
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the employer based the determination solely on medical
reports and the subjective beliefs of the employer. 2 7 The
court rejected the lesser test of elevated risk and required
that the employer show "a reasonable probability of sub-
stantial harm."12 8
In School Board v. Arline'2 9 the Supreme Court applied
the stricter standard ultimately adopted by Congress in
the ADA.13 0 In this case the Court found that Arline, in-
fected with the highly contagious disease of tuberculosis,
satisfied the requirements of a disabled individual. The
court further found that although her disease posed a sig-
nificant health threat to others, her employer was still re-
quired to determine whether reasonable accommodations
would lessen that threat. 13 1 The Court adopted the signif-
icant and direct threat standard, thus strengthening the
employer's duty to make individualized findings of fact for
each disabled individual.13 2
Employers are permitted to consider safety related is-
sues when hiring and retaining disabled workers under
the ADA. Employers must scrutinize specific evidence on
a case-by-case basis, however, to determine whether the
individual will pose a significant and direct threat to
others. This requirement furthers the goal of opening the
doors of employment to disabled individuals by casting
aside prejudices and preconceived notions that may cause
employers not to hire the disabled.
In conclusion, employers must carefully determine and
127 Id
128 Id.
129 480 U.S. 273 (1986).
,so Id. at 287 n.16. But see Doe v. Region 13 Mental Health - Mental Retarda-
tion Comm'n, 704 F.2d 1402 (5th Cir. 1983). In Doe the court adopted a rational
basis test to evaluate the perceived risk. Id. at 1409-10. The Supreme Court and
the ADA explicitly reject this standard.
13, Id. at 287-88.
12 Id. at 287. In a relevant part of the opinion the Court stated that an individ-
ualized inquiry "is essential if § 504 is to achieve its goal of protecting handi-
capped individuals from deprivations based on prejudice, stereotypes, or
unfounded fear, while giving appropriate weight to such legitimate concerns of
grantees as avoiding exposing others to significant health and safety risks." Id.
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document essential functions for each job position be-
cause the courts rely on written job descriptions in deter-
mining the essential functions of a position. The ADA
requires a highly individualized and fact specific inquiry
into each individual's ability to perform essential job func-
tions according to the employer's ability to provide rea-
sonable accommodations. Finally, although the ADA
imposes high standards, an employer is not required to
hire or retain unqualified individuals.
II. APPLICATION OF THE ADA TO THE AIRLINE
INDUSTRY
This section applies the provisions of the ADA to the
airline industry. First, this section evaluates the legal re-
quirements of medical examinations and applies these
standards to both pilots and flight attendants. The sec-
tion then discusses the employment issues concerning the
human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) for flight attend-
ants and pilots.
The airline industry is not specifically exempted from
the employment provisions of the ADA.'13 It is difficult to
predict the exact changes that the ADA will impose on the
industry. 3 4  Six months after the effective date of the
ADA, the contours and requirements of the ADA remain
unclear for virtually every category of American
business. 135
133 The legislative history expresses Congress's intent to exclude the airline in-
dustry from the public access provisions of Titles II and III. H.R. REP. No. 485,
101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 36, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 280. Con-
gress excluded the airline industry from these provisions in order to avoid statu-
tory overlap with the Air Carrier Access Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1374(c)(1) (1988), which
requires the airlines to make airplanes and airports accessible to the disabled. Id.
. 4 42 U.S.C. § 12,111(2), 12,111(5), 12,112 (Supp. III 1991); see, e.g., ALAN M.
KORAL & BRUCE McLANAHAN, EMPLOYER COMPLIANCE WITH THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT 51 (1990).
135 See Rubenstein, supra note 63, at 1; Daniel L. Stickler & Albert F. Sebok,
Legal Issues Surrounding Preemployment Physical Examinations in the Coal Industry, 94 W.
VA. L. REV. 811, 812-17 (1992) (discussing the effect of the ADA on current hiring
practices in the coal industry).
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A. MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS
New standards are now applicable to applicant and em-
ployee medical examinations. This section first describes
existing hiring practices in the airline industry and then
presents the likely ADA modifications to those practices.
In addition, this section examines the ways in which HIV-
related illnesses challenge the airline industry.
The physical and psychological capacity of applicants
for airline pilot positions are critical hiring criteria for
commercial airlines. Airline pilot hiring is also affected by
the legislative requirement that airlines operate with "the
highest possible degree" of care and safety. 136 It is cur-
rently uncertain whether the courts will give the airlines
the same broad discretion to determine hiring policies
under the ADA as they did under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967.'3 7 The ADA imposes new
restrictions on medical examinations that will affect pilot
and flight attendant hiring procedures. 38
1. Pilots
All commercial airline pilots must initially qualify for a
Class I flight certificate from a certified Federal Air Sur-
geon. 39 In addition to this minimum FAA requirement,
each airline normally establishes additional hiring criteria
and medical qualifications for its candidate pilots. Pilot
hiring procedures of the airlines have included proce-
dures that now would violate the provisions of the ADA.
136 49 U.S.C. § 1421(b) (1988).
137 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988); see, e.g., Robinson v. American Airlines, Inc.,
908 F.2d 1020 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Smallwood v. United Airlines, Inc., 728 F.2d 614
(4th Cir. 1984); Murnane v. American Airlines, Inc., 667 F.2d 98 (D.C. Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982).
138 42 U.S.C. § 12,112(d)(l)-(4) (Supp. III 1991).
1-1 14 C.F.R. § 67.1-.31 (1993); see aLso 49 U.S.C. app. § 1422(a) (1988) (em-
powering the Secretary of Transportation to issue airman certificates). 14 C.F.R
§ 67.1-.31 contains the minimum physical standards for pilots in the areas of vi-
sion, equilibrium, mental, neurological, cardiovascular, and other general medical
conditions. 14 C.F.R. § 67.13-.31 (1993). Additionally, the FAA vested sole au-
thority in the Federal Air Surgeon to determine whether an airman is medically
qualified. See Foster v. United States, 923 F.2d 765, 768 (9th Cir. 1991).
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Robinson v. American Airlines, Inc. 140 provides an example
of one hiring procedure for airline pilots. In Robinson the
court reviewed the American Airlines (American) pilot
hiring procedures and ruled that the procedures were
consistent with the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978.141
American employed a three-phase process to consider
new pilots. Phase I included an interview and physical ex-
amination. 142 Applicants were required to satisfy all of
American's phase I requirements in order to advance to
phase II.
Phase II consisted of a comprehensive medical exami-
nation, including a personality test, additional interviews,
and flight simulator testing. American rated all phase II
applicants on a scale of one to five based on the medical
criterion. Only those applicants who received a rating of
four or five were selected for participation in phase III.
Phase III included additional interviews and skill testing.
American offered permanent positions only to those can-
didates who successfully completed all three phases of the
process.
In addition to the three-phase application process,
American's hiring policy included an age thirty guideline
that discouraged the hiring of new pilots over the age of
thirty.' 4' American claimed that this guideline was in re-
sponse to the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA)
policy of mandatory retirement at age sixty.' 4 4 American
argued that in order to fulfill its statutory duty to provide
140 908 F.2d 1020 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
,4, 49 U.S.C. app. § 1552 (1988). The Airline Deregulation Act is not directly
relevant to this comment. This case is included to present the hiring procedures
of American Airlines. These procedures will later be compared to the require-
ments of the ADA.
142 Robinson, 908 F.2d at 1022. The examination tested the prospective pilot's
blood pressure, height, weight, and other physical characteristics. Id.
,43 Murnane v. American Airlines, Inc., 482 F. Supp. 135, 145 (D.D.C. 1979),
aftd, 667 F.2d 98 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982). The Murnane
court noted that the majority of airlines adopted the "age 30 guideline" as an
industry custom. Murnane, 482 F. Supp. at 145.
144 14 C.F.R. § 121.383(c) (1993). The court upheld the age 60 rule in
O'Donnell v. Shaffer, 491 F.2d 59 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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the highest degree of safety, 45 the intensive training pro-
gram requires an average of sixteen years to attain a Cap-
tain position. The airline also argued that if it were forced
to hire middle-aged pilots the experience level of older
pilots would decrease, thereby compromising passenger
safety. The court accepted American's reasoning and up-
held the guideline as a bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion (BFOQ). 46 The court noted that American's hiring
policies were typical in the airline industry. 47
The next section scrutinizes the provisions of the ADA
regarding medical examinations. 48 The ADA states that
"a covered entity shall not conduct a [preemployment]
medical examination... of ajob applicant [to determine]
whether such applicant is an individual with a disabil-
ity" 49 unless "an offer of employment has been made to a
job applicant."'' 50  Section 1211 l(d)(3) allows employers
to extend conditional offers to job applicants based on the
results of a medical examination if the employer satisfies
145 49 U.S.C. app. § 1421(b) (1988).
146 Murnane, 482 F. Supp. at 148. The D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court's
analysis in Murnane v. American Airlines, Inc., 667 F.2d 98 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The
circuit court relied on an earlier case, Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531
F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976), in which the Fifth Circuit approved a similar age guide-
line in the busing industry. Usery, 531 F.2d at 238. The Usery court allowed em-
ployers substantial discretion in setting standards intended to protect life and
limb. Id.
147 Murnane, 482 F. Supp. at 147.
148 The ADA permits an employer to maintain a drug and alcohol-free work
place. 42 U.S.C. § 12,114 (Supp. III 1991). The following is a general overview
of the ADA's drug and alcohol policy: (1) The ADA does not consider a test for
illegal drug use a medical examination; (2) A person currently using illegal drugs
is not an "individual with a disability" under the ADA; (3) Prohibition of drug and
alcohol use is not a violation of the ADA; (4) Testing for illegal drug use is al-
lowed under the ADA; (5) The ADA prohibits discriminating against a rehabili-
tated drug addict; (6) The term "individual with a disability" includes a person
who is an alcoholic; (7) An employer may discipline, discharge, or deny employ-
ment to an alcoholic whose alcohol use impairs job performance; (8) Employees
using drugs or alcohol may be required to satisfy the same performance standards
as those set for other employees. Id. § 12,114(a)-(d).
149 Id. § 12,112(d)(2)(A); see also G. William Davenport, The Americans with Disa-
bilities Act: An Appraisal of the Major Employment Related Compliance and Litigation Issues,
43 ALA. L. REV. 307, 312-13 (1992) (explaining limitations on medical
examinations).
- 42 U.S.C. § 12,112(d)(3) (Supp. III 1991).
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three conditions.'' First, the employer must subject all
incoming employees to the examination "regardless of
disability."' i5 2 Second, the employer must keep all medi-
cal information confidential.15 3 Third, the employer can-
not use the results of the examination inconsistently with
the ADA.' 5 4  Additionally, employers can require post-
employment medical examinations to determine an em-
ployee's ability to perform job-related functions, as long
as the results are used consistently with the ADA.1 55
Little doubt exists that physical and psychological fit-
ness are necessary requirements for all airline pilots.' 56
Courts have traditionally granted airlines and other travel
industries great discretion in determining policies in-
tended to assure passenger safety.157 In Robinson v. Ameri-
15, Id.
152 Id. § 12,112(d)(3)(A). The ADA allows employers to classify groups of em-
ployees and require medical examinations only for certain groups. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.14(b) app. (1993); see also EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYMENT COMMISSION,
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL FOR THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT § VI-
3 (1992) [hereinafter TECHNICAL MANUAL]. For example, the ADA would permit
an airline to limit the medical examination requirement to pilots, if the airline
included all pilots. Philip L. Gordon, The Job Application Process After the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 18 EMPL. REL. L.J. 185, 189 (1992).
153 42 U.S.C. § 12,112(d)(3)(B) (Supp. III 1991); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b)
app. (1993).
' 42 U.S.C. § 12,112(d)(3)(C) (Supp. III 1991). Restated, before denying a
disabled applicant a job, the employer must determine whether a reasonable ac-
commodation is required or if the disabled applicant poses a direct threat to
others. See supra notes 61-74 and 110-132 and accompanying text. Additionally,
employers "may make inquiries into the ability of an employee to perform job-
related functions." 42 U.S.C. § 12,112(d)(4)(B) (Supp. III 1991).
155 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(c) (1993). Medical inquiries for employees "must be
job related and consistent with business necessity." TECHNICAL MANUAL, supra
note 152, § VI-12. Additionally, "the scope of the examination must also be job-
related." Id. The ADA permits employer-sponsored "wellness" and health
screening programs providing that: (1) Program participation is voluntary; (2) All
information obtained is kept confidential according to requirements of the ADA;
and (3) The employer does not use the information for discriminatory purposes.
Id. § VI-15.
156 Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
,-7 See Himburg v. NTSB, 930 F.2d 33 (10th Cir. 1991); Kirkendall v. Busey,
922 F.2d 654, 657 (11th Cir. 1991); Baker v. FAA, 917 F.2d 318, 319 (7th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 936 (1991); Meik v. NTSB, 710 F.2d 584, 585 (9th Cir.
1983).
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can Airlines, Inc., t58 for example, the court held that an
airline "is free to impose more stringent requirements"
than the minimum requirements promulgated by the
FAA.' 59 The court noted that American implemented the
more stringent physical requirements to reduce the risk of
pilot incapacitation during flight. 60 The court found that
American had therefore acted consistently with the statu-
tory obligation to operate with its " 'highest possible degree'
of care."' 61 In Murnane v. American Airlines, Inc. 162 the
court stated that "the airline industry must be accorded
great leeway and discretion in determining the manner in
which it may be operated most safely."' 63 The court re-
fused to substitute its judgment for that of the airline "in
a cause presenting safety as the critical element."' 6 4 The
court noted that safe is not sufficient for the passenger
who expects the safest possible airline service.' 65
Because airline safety remains a critical concern of both
the government and the private air carriers, the rationale
followed in these cases will arguably carry over to the
ADA.' 66 Two unique characteristics of the ADA, however,
require extra attention from the airline industry. The first
is the ADA's focus upon the individual in order to elimi-
nate broad stereotypes of the disabled. Therefore, under
the ADA, before rejecting a candidate pilot's application
on the basis of a direct threat to the safety of others, an
airline must perform an individualized fact specific inquiry
into the circumstances of that particular individual. 67
The airline must document a significant current risk to
158 908 F.2d 1020 (D.C. Cir 1990).
159 Id. at 1023.
160 Id.
161 Id. (emphasis added).
162 667 F.2d 98 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982).
16- Id. at 101.
164 Id.
165 Id.
66 The EEOC stated that airlines can comply with the medical testing required
by the FAA and not violate the ADA. TECHNICAL MANUAL, supra note 152, § VI-5,
6.
167 Id. § IV-Il.
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others based on concrete medical evidence, 68 evaluate
the individual pilot's physical and mental conditions,'69
and, most importantly, determine if a reasonable accom-
modation will reduce the direct threat. 70 Thus, if the air-
lines justify their procedures with a passenger Safety
rationale, they must rely on established medical evidence
and perform individualized inquiries.' 7'
The second limitation centers on the ADA's require-
ment that an employer base a risk to others on a current
risk and not a speculative future risk.172 This requirement
may present difficulties if, under pre-ADA policies, an air-
line routinely rejected candidates with deteriorating phys-
ical conditions which were satisfactory at the time of
testing. In this situation, the candidate pilot does not rep-
resent a direct threat at the time of testing. The pilot will
only cross the significant risk threshold outlined by the
EEOC in the future as the pilot's physical condition dete-
riorates. 73 A candidate pilot in this situation may suc-
- Id. Employers must "identify the specific behavior that would pose the 'di-
rect threat' " if the perceived risk arises from psychological disabilities. Id.
Sources of objective evidence include: information from the individual; experi-
ence of the individual in prior employment situations; and documentation from
experts in the disability area or from doctors who have direct knowledge of the
individual's condition. Id. § IV-12.
169 Id. § IV-I 1-12. Employers must base the direct threat analysis on "objec-
tive, factual evidence related to that individual's present ability to safely perform
the essential functions of a job. It cannot be based on unfounded assumptions,
fears, or stereotypes about the nature or effect of a disability or of disability gener-
ally." Id. (emphasis in original).
170 See supra notes 110-32 and accompanying text.
I In Murnane v. American Airlines, Inc., 667 F.2d 98, 101-02 (D.C. Cir. 1981),
American conceded the economic benefit of hiring younger pilots who would
serve for a longer period of time as a Captain. The court, however, concluded
that the collateral economic effect derived from the policy was an insufficient rea-
son to declare the policy invalid when compared to the substantial safety benefits
derived from the policy. Id. at 101 n.6. In the ADA context, any collateral bene-
fits incidental to hiring nondisabled pilots are arguably not a factor when evaluat-
ing the reasonableness of an employment policy decision.
172 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) app. (1993). The risk can only be considered when it
poses a significant risk, i.e., high probability of substantial harm; a speculative or
remote risk is insufficient.
173 TECHNICAL MANUAL, supra note 152, § IV-I 1. The EEOC guideline cited an
example of a deteriorating back condition that may worsen over time as an insuffi-
cient "indication of imminent potential harm." Id.
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cessfully argue that the airline could provide a reasonable
accommodation by allowing frequent medical checks to
monitor the condition. Accordingly, if an airline rejects a
disabled pilot candidate, the airline must document both
the medical theories relied upon as well as the individual
symptoms of the pilot. Additionally, all medical hiring
policies should contain references to safety
considerations.
The hiring policies outlined in Robinson and Murnane"74
raise several issues under the current interpretations of
the ADA. First, the three-phase process may violate the
ADA's blanket prohibition on preemployment medical
testing since American conducts the medical and psycho-
logical examinations before extending offers.175 The pro-
hibition on preemployment testing will clearly affect the
competitive hiring policy implemented at American. In-
stead of factoring the results of medical examinations into
the competitive analysis, the ADA may require American
to postpone medical testing until after extending a condi-
tional offer to pilots. American may have to limit its pre-
employment testing to areas such as flying skills and other
nonmedical job requirements.
The second issue relates to American's policy of impos-
ing medical requirements above those required by the
FAA. 176 In Robinson the court granted broad discretion to
the airline in choosing the safest policies for the protec-
tion of its passengers. 77 The court based this finding on
a safety rationale."T8 Under the ADA, however, unsub-
stantiated claims of a threat to third persons are insuffi-
cient."79 Instead, to comply with the ADA, American
should document the precise medical rationale behind the
heightened requirements. The ADA requires employers
to avoid stereotypes by basing hiring decisions on the
174 See supra notes 140-47 and 162-65 and accompanying text.
175 42 U.S.C. § 12,112(d)(2) (Supp. III 1991).
176 Robinson v. American Airlines, Inc., 908 F.2d 1020, 1023 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 TECHNICAL MANUAL, supra note 152, § IV-10.
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facts and not the myths of hiring the disabled. 8 ' While
airlines may still cite physical condition as a critical con-
sideration in hiring decisions, the ADA requires the air-
lines to consider all the facts and focus on the
individual.' 8' Pilots play a critical role in airline safety,
and the courts will arguably allow the airlines considera-
ble discretion in establishing pilot testing requirements
intended to maximize safety.
2. Flight Attendants
Courts may view employment restrictions on flight at-
tendants under a narrower standard than the broad dis-
cretion allowed in pilot hiring. Flight attendants play a
role in passenger safety only in the event of an accident.
Pilot responsibility for safety, however, begins before the
flight departs, and does not end until after all the passen-
gers deplane.
The airlines in the Murnane case relied upon the six-
teen-year training period for a Captain to justify hiring
only younger pilots.'82 This argument would fail if ap-
plied to flight attendants under the ADA. First, the re-
sponsibilities of a flight attendant are not parallel to those
of a pilot. In addition to providing for the safety of the
180 See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text. The Fifth Circuit, in the case
that set the framework for the age 40 BFOQ under the ADEA, summarized its
rationale for granting broad discretion to the busing industry. Usery v. Tamiami
Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 238 (5th Cir. 1976).
[T]he employer must be afforded substantial discretion in selecting
specific standards which, if they err at all, should err on the side of
preservation of life and limb. The employer must of course show a
reasonable basis for its assessment of risk of injury/death. But it
cannot be expected to establish this to a certainty, for certainty
would require running the risk until a tragic accident would prove
that the judgment was sound. Priceless as is a single life in our con-
cept of the value of human life and our undoubted unwillingness
ever to approve a practice which might kill one, but not, say, twenty,
we think the safety factor should be evaluated in terms of the possi-
bility . . . of injury/death.
Id.
181 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
182 Murnane v. American Airlines, Inc., 667 F.2d 98, 101 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982).
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passengers, flight attendants also perform a service func-
tion - serving meals and drinks, and providing for passen-
ger comfort. Flight attendants act more often in the
service role than in the safety function. Additionally, the
training period of a flight attendant is dramatically shorter
than the pilot training program.8 3
Second, the FAA has neither promulgated strict medi-
cal requirements nor regulated flight attendants in the
manner that it has pilots.184 The scarcity of federally man-
dated rules demonstrates that the FAA is less concerned
with flight attendant regulations than with pilot regula-
tions.'8 5 One important FAA regulation sets the mini-
mum number of flight attendants on a given type of
aircraft based on an evacuation requirement. 8 6 This re-
quirement, however, is only a minimum requirement, and
the airlines inevitably provide additional flight attendants
to promote efficient passenger service. 8 7
183 The safety advantages achieved by training flight attendants to handle emer-
gency situations are not meant to be underemphasized nor are the contributions
of flight attendants in exigent circumstances intended to be derided. Rather, this
discussion highlights the differing ADA legal requirements between pilots and
flight attendants.
14 See Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 413,419 (N.D. Cal.
1977), modified, 649 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1980).
I'5 Perhaps one explanation for this difference is that the FAA attributed 90%
of all airline accidents to pilot error. Murnane v. American Airlines, Inc., 482 F.
Supp. 135, 147 (D.D.C. 1979), aftd, 667 F.2d 98 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 915 (1982). Instead of federally mandated requirements, each airline estab-
lishes independent hiring requirements for flight attendants. For example, the
Fourth Circuit's opinion in Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361, 365
n.2 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981), included a description of the
physical activities, emergency duties, and working conditions of Eastern's flight
attendants. The physical activity list included lifting, prolonged standing, bend-
ing, and kneeling. Id. In an emergency situation, flight attendants are required to
lift out emergency exit windows, handle a 120-pound life raft, assist passengers in
evacuation, and handle psychological reactions to hijacking. Id. The working
conditions list was far more extensive and more typical of everyday flight attend-
ant duties. These duties included providing extra care to passengers, enduring
pressurized cabins, working long hours, dealing with temperature extremes, han-
dling light to severe turbulence, and complying with irregular work schedules. Id.
186 14 C.F.R. § 121.391 (1993). The regulation requires the flight crew to evac-
uate the airplane in less than 90 seconds. Id. § 135 app. A.
187 14 C.F.R. § 121.391 (1993) requires air carriers to provide a minimum of
one flight attendant per 50 passenger seats.
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Although the safety burdens placed on flight attendants
are considerably less than those burdens facing pilots,
certain characteristics are arguably essential functions of
the flight attendant's job description. For example, in
case of an emergency airplane evacuation, flight attend-
ants are often required to open the over-wing emergency
exits. 18  This function generally requires the flight at-
tendant to operate the release levers on the door, remove
the door from its hinged position, lift the door over a row
of seats, and place the door in the seat row behind the
emergency exit. Accordingly, flight attendants, in order
to perform this task, should, for example, possess a mod-
erate level of strength and not suffer from back problems
that prevent lifting heavy objects. 1 9
An airline should comply with the following ADA pro-
cedures if the airline requires flight attendants to lift
heavy objects. First, the airline's position description
should define the ability to lift heavy objects as an essen-
tial function in a written job description and define the
type, weight, and expected duration of the lifting require-
ment. 90 Second, the ADA permits the airline to adminis-
ter a pre-offer agility test to determine physical
qualifications for essential job functions.' 9 ' The ADA dis-
tinguishes between a pre-offer agility test and the prohib-
ited pre-offer medical examination on the grounds that
the former does not require a medical diagnosis. 9 2
Third, the airline can extend a conditional offer to the
candidate flight attendant and, only at this time, perform
additional medical testing to determine whether the appli-
188 Although the seat back instruction card explains the emergency exit door
operation, passengers are often uninformed on the operation of the doors or are
unable to provide effective assistance. See Burwell, 633 F.2d at 366 ("During eight
emergencies since 1954 flight attendants were required and did in fact perform
practically all of the emergency procedures"); see also Harriss, 437 F. Supp. at 421.
189 An emergency exit door weighs between 75 and 100 pounds. Harriss, 437 F.
Supp. at 421.
19 See supra notes 89-109 and accompanying text; TECHNICAL MANUAL, supra
note 152, § 11-19.
191 TECHNICAL MANUAL, supra note 152, § IV-8.
192 Id.
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cant can adequately perform the essential job
functions. t93
Finally, and most importantly, the airline must deter-
mine whether an applicant who fails the agility or medical
test could safely perform the job with a reasonable accom-
modation." 4 The direct threat analysis that applies to pi-
lots will arguably fail in the flight attendant context
because the risk of substantial harm is too remote and
speculative.
B. HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS: HIRING AND
COMMUNICABLE DISEASES
A presidential committee has determined that wide-
spread discrimination exists against those infected with
HIV. 195 This discrimination may have serious repercus-
sions on the worldwide effort to control the spread of the
disease.' 96 Accordingly, Congress explicitly defined per-
sons infected with the HIV virus and those suffering from
AIDS as disabled under the ADA.' 97
1. Flight Attendants
It is clear that an airline could not refuse to hire a flight
attendant infected with HIV by relying on a public health
rationale since it is unlikely that infection could result.'9 8
19, See supra notes 89-103 and accompanying text.
-9 See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
19, H. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 31-32, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 313. In discussing the potential HIV epidemic, President Bush
stated:
Today, I call on the House of Representatives to get on with the job
of passing a law - as embodied in the Americans with Disabilities
Act - that prohibits discrimination against those with HIV and
AIDS. We're in a fight against a disease - not a fight against peo-
ple. And we won't tolerate discrimination.
136 CONG. REC. 13,058 (1990) (Senator Harkin quoting President George Bush).
196 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 313; see also AIDS Conferees Face the Scourge, 10,000
Global Experts Meet to Assess Fight Against HIV, CHI. TRIB., July 19, 1992, at C21.
197 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 333.
'98 TECHNICAL MANUAL, supra note 152, § IV-I 1 (stating that "it is medically es-
tablished that [HIV] can only be transmitted through sexual contact, use of in-
fected needles, or other entry into a person's blood stream").
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Congress provides for the removal of otherwise quali-
fied disabled individuals from food-handling jobs in lim-
ited situations. 99 Persons with communicable diseases
included on an annual list published by the Secretary of
Health and Human Services can be barred from food-han-
dling jobs.2 0 0 The Department of Health and Human
Services, however, does not include AIDS on the list of
diseases transmittable through food.20 ' If the possibility
of the spread of infectious diseases existed, the airline
could provide reasonable accommodations to lessen the
risk of infection by isolating infected flight attendants
from all food-handling positions. In addition, the statu-
tory duty to provide safe air service is directed toward air
safety issues and not toward traditional public health
issues. 2
2. Pilots
Although the ADA may bar an airline from denying em-
ployment to an HIV-infected flight attendant, the airline
could arguably rely on the rationale used in Murnane v.
American Airlines, Inc. 203 to exclude an HIV-infected candi-
date pilot. The airline would first rely on the statutory
duty to use the highest degree of care for the safety of its
passengers. °4 Courts have traditionally given air carriers
great latitude in determining the procedures to provide
safe air transport, and the airlines could rely on the defer-
ential language of courts as a starting point. Second, the
I- See 42 U.S.C. § 12,113(d)(2) (Supp. III 1991); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.16(e) app.
(1993).
200 42 U.S.C. § 12,113(d)(2) (Supp. III 1991). Additionally, courts are deferen-
tial to local and municipal ordinances for removing infected persons from food-
handling jobs if reasonable accommodations are unavailable. Id. If local laws are
unclear, the employer can rely on the direct threat standard. See supra part I.C.
201 See Diseases Transmitted Through the Food Supply, 56 Fed. Reg. 40,897
(1991).
202 See, e.g., Doe v. Department of Transp., 412 F.2d 674, 677 (8th Cir. 1969)
(recognizing the focus on safety in § 1421).
.20s 482 F. Supp. 135 (D.D.C. 1979), afd, 667 F.2d 98 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982).
224 49 U.S.C. § 1421(b) (1988).
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airline should document the intensive training program
implemented to maximize safety and minimize pilot error.
Documentation adds to the airline's claim that the
adopted procedures are both necessary and the safest
possible. Third, relying on medical facts detailing the life
expectancy of an AIDS/HIV patient and citing the long
and intensive training period required to become fully
proficient as an airplane pilot, the airline would argue that
pilots infected with the HIV virus will die sooner than ex-
pected, thereby lowering the average experience level in
the cockpit. Consequently, the risk to passengers will in-
crease because of decreased pilot experience level. °5
The success of this type of argument will largely depend
on how the courts interpret case law from the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act,20 6 and how much defer-
ence the courts will grant the airlines when the safety of
passengers is at stake.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is clear that the ADA will have a sweeping effect on
airline employment practices. The definition of disability
is sufficiently broad to include many classes of individuals.
In fact, the ADA may be broad enough to include many
classes of individuals not commonly considered disabled.
It may take several years before the full breadth of the
ADA is recognized. Equally poignant is the fact that the
airline industry is within the grasp of the ADA. The legal
requirements of the ADA coupled with its expansive legis-
lative goals will arguably have a dramatic effect on candi-
date pilot and flight attendant hiring considerations.
205 One apparent weakness in this argument is that because the potential
number of pilots infected with AIDS is dramatically less than the number of pilots
who inevitably age, the cumulative effect of employing only a few pilots with HIV
is considerably lower.
2 0 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988).
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